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If rivals watched with gimlet eyes,
Canaris’s political patrons had reason
to look the other way. He was soon enmeshed in the government’s efforts to
circumvent the naval-armament provisions of the Versailles treaty that had
ended World War I. With his international networks delivered, Canaris won
only muted applause in Berlin.
Grand Admiral Erich Raeder was leery
of Canaris, who he feared was compromised politically. Mueller acknowledges
the awkwardness between the two officers but emphasizes Raeder’s professionalism. Raeder’s own memoir
supports that judgment. Setting his
personal feelings aside, Raeder intervened to elevate Canaris to the head
of the Abwehr.
At first Canaris walked the razor’s edge
between collaboration with the Nazi
regime and open resistance. The spring
of 1938 was the turning point. The cumulative effect of the Blomberg and
Fritsch scandals, destroying the careers
of the war minister and the commanding general of the Wehrmacht, respectively, was too much for an old-school
naval officer. Still in uniform, Canaris
became the heart of the opposition circle in Abwehr headquarters.
Canaris’s career-long wrangling with
his political and diplomatic counterparts will resonate with military intelligence officers today. His death in the
bloodletting unleashed by Claus von
Stauffenberg’s failed attempt on Hitler’s
life is startling only for its accidental
nature. The real surprise is that he was
untouched until the Abwehr was dissolved in mid-1944.
Who was Wilhelm Canaris? A loyal servant of “the other Germany” or a
right-wing Nazi sympathizer? What
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accounts for Himmler’s indulgent, even
protective, attitude toward Canaris and
his circle? The wily yet principled admiral is an incomplete puzzle. However,
Mueller puts new pieces on the table,
while nudging others into place.
Readers will appreciate Muller’s abundant reference notes, exhaustive bibliography, and index. Sadly, the work is
marred by the absence of rigorous
copyediting and fact-checking; names
in particular suffer. But these are minor
quibbles. Mueller’s work is an important contribution to the literature, and
the Naval Institute deserves a laurel for
bringing it to these shores.
ANTHONY D. MCIVOR

Partner, Black Swan Advisors, LLC

Harari, Yuval Noah. Special Operations in the Age
of Chivalry: 1100–1550. Suffolk, U.K.: Boydell,
2007. 224pp. $90

Yuval Noah Harari published this book
in the midst of the ongoing struggles
among the Hezbollah militia from Lebanon, the Palestinian Hamas militias,
and the Israeli army. These contemporary events, especially the special operations undertaken by all sides, provide
the backdrop to this work. With regard
to medieval special operations, not
much has been written, and Harari endeavors to fill this void by focusing his
work on a general readership rather
than a strictly scholarly audience.
The title of this book is eye-catching
but immediately raises questions: What
does the author mean by “special operations,” and what is meant by “the Age
of Chivalry”? The author’s use of the
phrase, which dates back to the high
and late Middle Ages, is really nothing
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more than a literary choice. It is easy
for the reader to get distracted in the
discussion regarding the term and the
notions of chivalry and chivalric virtues. Harari does not imply that the
employment of deception, guile, kidnapping, and assassination as means of
political and military operations was
contrary to the code of conduct. Rather,
he says that they were not the normal
methods of operation but were in that
sense unconventional and therefore
special. He notes specifically that the
code of chivalry never stood in the way
of success or victory and that medieval
special operations almost always necessitated foul play. This brings us to the
second and more substantial issue—
Harari’s definition of special
operations.
The author defines special operations as
combat operations that are limited in
area, size, and duration and that, relative to the resources expended, have
disproportionate strategic and political
results. Additionally, he notes, they are
by their nature covert and unconventional. While covertness is a given, because a small force cannot hope to
accomplish its mission if discovered,
the concept of unconventionality causes
a problem. Not all medieval battles
were fought between two opposing
forces lined up three battalions abreast,
with a melee following a few volleys of
arrows and charges of knights. The
large, set-piece battle was in fact relatively rare; the small-unit raid was more
the norm. This issue is not whether the
operations are “special” but rather
whether the examples used actually
meet a modern definition of special operations. Modern special operations are
similar to Harari’s definition in that
they are designed to achieve covertly a

political or strategic end, but both the
operation and the effect are planned,
and the operations are usually carried
out, by specially trained forces, not necessarily by small detachments of conventional soldiers. By his less rigorous
definition, nearly all small actions could
be regarded as “special.”
Harari’s preface and first chapter,
which together account for nearly
one-third of the book, define medieval
special operations and then list a plethora of examples, such as small-unit
raids, political intrigues carried out by
military forces, assassinations, hostage
takings, kidnappings, and associated
rescues. He focuses on inland special
operations targeting infrastructure or
people or national symbols (either people or strategic places). However, his
methodology for selecting examples is
unclear. As a result, chapter 1 is long on
examples but short on the analysis of
their impacts—the one true weakness
of the book.
Of the other cases specifically explored,
the assassination of King Conrad of Jerusalem by the Nizaris (Assassins) in
1192 and the destruction of the imperial flour mill at Auriol by the French in
1536 are more in line with the contemporary definition of special operations.
These examples feature specially trained
troops executing plans that had strategic and political goals and involved
limited resources. It is in these cases
that the true value of this work is
evident.
Harari successfully shifts the reader’s
attention from the glory of the large,
set-piece battle to the implications of
the actions of small forces of soldiers,
no matter whether their operations
were special or not. The author’s
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writing style is captivating, and the
book meets its stated aim of providing a
popular history of medieval special operations. Harari, whether intentionally
or not, demonstrates the importance of
being able to fight hybrid wars.
MARK K. VAUGHN

Naval War College

Luttwak, Edward N. The Grand Strategy of the
Byzantine Empire, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap,
2009. 512pp. $35

In the Western historical imagination,
the Eastern Roman Empire, which ruled
from Constantinople (now Istanbul,
Turkey) from AD 330 until 1453, has received mostly disdain and neglect. The
term “Byzantine” carries some negative
connotations. One dictionary defines
“byzantine” (lower-case b) as “characterized by a devious and usually surreptitious manner of operation.” In the
often-quoted judgment of a Victorian
historian, “Its vices were the vices of
men who had ceased to be brave without learning to be virtuous. . . . The history of the Empire is a monotonous
story of the intrigues of priests, eunuchs
and women, of poisonings, of conspiracies, of uniform ingratitude, of perpetual fratricides.”
The academic study of Byzantine history, the preserve of a rather inbred
community, requires mastery of difficult medieval Greek, the intricacies of
Orthodox theology, and other esoteric
specialties. But in recent years the work
of a new generation of talented Byzantinists has given us English translations
of many long-inaccessible primary
sources, including an extensive body of
military texts.
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In 1976, military analyst and historian
Edward Luttwak published The Grand
Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the
First Century AD to the Third, advancing
a controversial thesis that the empire
developed a conscious and consistent
strategy of “defense in depth,” based on
lines of frontier forts, backed by regional and central mobile armies.
In this new work, on the Eastern Empire’s grand strategy, Luttwak explains
that after the collapse of the Western
Empire in the fifth century, Eastern emperors no longer enjoyed this luxury.
Faced by endless waves of nomadic
horse archers from the steppes, plus
Sassanid Persia (the persistent traditional enemy to the east), the empire
could not afford to fight decisive battles
or wars of attrition, which would only
deplete the costly, carefully trained imperial army. Trying to annihilate the
present enemy would only smooth the
way for the next tribe migrating out of
Central Asia. The empire’s most natural
ally was whatever tribe was stacked up
behind the horde currently assailing the
Danube frontier.
The empire developed an “operational
code” that combined shrewd diplomacy, careful intelligence, defensive
siege craft, and well-placed bribery,
with military force as a last resort.
When battle could not be avoided,
Byzantine generals practiced “relational
maneuver,” a style of fighting based on
insight into the strengths and weaknesses of each enemy.
The rise of Islam in the seventh century
represented a deadly new threat, based
on an aggressive religious ideology.
With strongly disaffected religious minorities in its Syrian and North African
provinces, the empire was particularly
vulnerable. Luttwak explains how a
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